전쟁부(DOW)-미확인 이상 현상(UAP)-D048, 공군 보고서, 1996년

This report describes the Modeling of Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Calculations, documenting historical launch failure modes and recommending corrective actions to address them using novel modelling techniques.

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Contract No. FO4703-91-C-0112 RTI Report No. RTI/5180/77-43F
Task No. 10/95-77, Subtask 2.0 September 10, 1996
Modeling Unlikely Space-Booster
Failures in Risk Calculations
Final Report
Prepared by
James A. Ward, Jr.
Robert M. Montgomery
of
Research Triangle Institute
Center for Aerospace Technology
Launch Systems Safety Department
Prepared for
Department of the Air Force
45th Space Wing (AFSPC)
Safety Office -45 SW/SE
Patrick AFB, FL 32925
and
Department of the Air Force
30th Space Wing (AFSPC)
Safety Office -30 SW /SE
Vandenberg AFB, CA 93437
Distribution authorized to US Government agencies and their contractors to protect administrative/
operational use data, 10 September 96. Other requests for this document shall be referred to the 30th Space
Wing (AFSPC) Safety Office (30 SW/SE), Vandenberg AFB, CA 93437, or 45th Space Wing (AFSPC)
Safety Office (45 SW/SE), Patrick AFB, FL 32925.

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f.1odeling Unlikely Space-Booster Failures in Risk Galculations C: F04703-91-C-o112
TA:10/95-TT
6. AUTHORW •
James A. ard, Jr.
Robert M. Montgomery
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Department of the Air Force (AFSPC) Department of the Air Force (AFSPC) AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
-m.-t1<a-a
30th Space Wing 45th Space Wing
r-\~'1-~.1
Vandenberg AFB, CA 93437 Patrick AFB, FL 32925
-Mr. Martin Kinna (30 SW/SEY) Louis J. Ullian, Jr. (45 SW/SED)
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be referred to the 30th Space Wing (AFSPC) Safety Office (30 SW/SE),Vandenberg AFB, CA
93437, or 45th Space Wing (AFSPC) Safety Office (45 SW/SE), Patrick AFB, FL 32925.
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)
Missile and space-vehicle performance histories contain many examples of failures that cause, or have the
potential to cause, significant vehicle deviations from the intended flight line. In RTl's risk-analysis program,
DAMP, such failures are referred to as Mode-5 failure responses. Although Mode--5 failure responses are much
less likely to occur than those that result in impacts near the flight line, risk-analysis studies are incomplete without
them. This report shows how Impacts from Mode-6 failures are modeled in program DAMP. The impact density
function used for this purpose contains two shaping constants that control the rate at which the density function
drops In value as the angular deviation from the flight line and the impact range increase. Certain Mode--5
•malfunctions are simulated, and the two shaping constants then chosen by trial and error so that impacts from the
simulated malfunctions and the theoretical density function are in close agreement. An appendix to the report
contains alisting and brief narrative failure history of the A~as, Delta, and Titan missile and space-vehicle launches
from the Eastern and Western Ranges from the beginning of each program through August 1996. Each entry
gives the vehicle configuration, whether the flight was asuccess, the flight phase in which any anomalous behavior
occurred, and aclassification of vehicl~ behavior in accordance with defined failure-response modes.
14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF PAGES·
launch risk, unlikely failure modeling, booster failure probabilities 180
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Abstract
Missile and space-vehicle performance histories contain many examples of failures that
cause, or have the potential to cause, significant vehicle deviations from the intended
flight line. In RTI's risk-analysis program, DAMP, such failures are referred to as
Mode-5 failure responses. Although Mode-5 failure responses are much less likely to
occur than those that result in impacts near the flight line, risk-analysis studies are
•i ncomplete without them. This report shows how impacts from Mode-5 failures are
modeled in program DAMP. The impact density function used for this purpose
contains two shaping constants that control the rate at which the density function drops
in value as the angular deviation from the flight line and the impact range increase.
Certain Mode-5 malfunctions are simulated, and the two shaping constants then chosen
by trial and error so that impacts from the simulated malfunctions and the theoretical
density function are in close agreement.
An appendix to the report contains a listing and brief narrative failure history of the
Atlas, Delta, and Titan missile and space-vehicle launches from the Eastern and
Western Ranges from the beginning of each program through August 1996. Each entry
gives the vehicle configuration, whether the flight was a success, the flight phase in
which any anomalous behavior occurred, and a classification of vehicle behavior in
accordance with defined failure-response modes. Various filtering or data weighting
techniques are described. The empirical data are then filtered to estimate (1) failure
probabilities for Atlas, Delta, and Titan, and (2) percentages of future failures that will
result in Mode-5 (and other Mode) responses.
9/10/96 RTI

Table of Contents ·
1. Introduction............................................................................................................................... 1
2. Examples Showing Need for Mode 5 ................................................................................ 3
3. Understanding the Mode-5 Failure Response ................................................................... 7
3.1 Effects of Mode-5 Shaping Consta.nts ................................. ". .................................... -...... 9
3.2 Effects of Shaping Constant on DAMP Results ........................................................ 9
4. Methodology for Assessing Failure Probabilities ........................................................... 13
4.1 The Parts-Analysis Approach .................................................................................. 13'-
4.2 The Empirical Approach .......................................................................................... 15
5. Computation of Failure Probabilities ............................................................................... 16
5.1 Overall Failure Probability ....................................................................................... 16
5.2 Relative and Absolute Probabilities for Response Modes ..................................... 24
5.3 Relative Probability of Tumble for Response-Modes 3 and 4 ............................... 30
6. Shaping Constants Through Simulation .......................................................................... 31
6.1 Malfunction Tum. Simulations...........• .. .................................................................... 31
6.1.1 Random-Attitu.de Failures ...............-............................................................... 31
6.1.2 Slow-Tum Failures ........................................................................................... 32
6.1.3 Factors Affecting Malfunction-Tum Results ................................................ 33
6.1.4 Malfunction-Tum Results for Atlas IIAS ...................................................... 35
6.2 Shaping Constants for Atlas IIAS ............................................................................ 37
6.2.1 Optimum Mode-5 Shaping Constants ........................................................... 37
6.2.2 Launch-Area Mode-5 Risks ............................................................................ 49
I
6.2.3 Effects of Mode-5 Constants on Ship-Hit Contours ..................................... 51
6.2.4 Range Distributions of Theoretical and Simulated Impacts. ....................... 58
6.3 Shaping Constants for Delta-GEM .......................................................................... 60
6.3.1 Optimum Mode-5 Shaping Constants ........................................................... 61
6.3.2 Launch-Area Mode-5 Risks ............................................................................ 64
6.4 Shaping Constants for Titan IV................................................................................ 65
6.5 Shaping Constants for LLVl .................................................................................... 69
6.6 Shaping Constants for Other Launch Vehicles ....................................................... 72
7. Potential Future Investigations ......................................................................................... 73
8. Summarv:............................................................................................................................ 74
.,
9/10/96 ii RTI

Appendix A. Failure Response Modes in Program DAMP ............................................... 79
Appendix B. Shaping-Constant Effects on Mode-5 Impact Distributions ........................ 81
Appendix C. Filter Characteristics ....................................................................................... 90
Appendix D. Launch and Performance Histories .............................................................. 96
D.1 Basic Data ................................................................................................................. 96
D.1.1 Data Sources ................................................................................................................................................................... 96
D.1.2 Assignment of Failure-Response Modes ...................................................... 98
D.1.3 Assignment of Flight Phase. ......................................... ....................................................................... 98
~
D.1.4 Representative Configurations ................................................................... 100
D.2 Atlas Launch and Performance History .............................................................. 101
D.2.1 A'tlas Launch History ..................................................................................................... 103
D.2.2 Atlas Failure Narratives ........... .................................................................... 115
~
D.3 Delta Launch and Performance History .............................................................. 133
D.3.1 Delta Launch History ................................................................................... 136
D.3.2 Delta Failure Narratives .............................................................................. 142
D.4 Titan Launch and Performance History .............................................................. 146
D.4.1 Titan Launch History ................................................................................... 149
D.4.2 Titan Failure Narratives .............................................................................. 157
D.5 Thor Launch and Performance History (Not Including Delta) ......................... 164
D.5.1 Thor and Thor-Boosted Launch History .................................................... 164
D.5.2 Thor and Thor-Boosted Failure Narratives ............................................... 167
References............................................................................................................................. 171
9/10/96 iii RTI

Table of Figures
Figure 1. Joust Impact Trace Showing a Mode-5 Failure Response ....................................6
Figure 2. Atlas IIAS Risk Contours for Inner-Ear Injury with A = 3.0.............................. 11
Figure 3. Atlas IIAS Risk Contours for Inner-Ear Injury with A = 3.5.............................. 12
Figure 4. Filter Factor Results for Representative Configurations of Atlas ...................... 23
Figure 5. Combined Random-Attitude and Slow-Tum Results ........................................ 36
Figure 6. Atlas IIAS Breakup Percentages for Random-Attitude Tums ........................... 37
Figure 7. Atlas HAS Impacts with No Breakup ........................................................ ........ 39
~
Figure 8. Atlas IIAS Impacts with Breakup ......................................................................... 40
Figure 9. Atlas IIAS Simulation Results with B = 1,000 ..................................................... 42
Figure 10. Atlas IIAS Simulation Results with B = 50,000.................................................. 44
Figure 11. Atlas HAS Simulation Results with B = 100,000................................................ 45
Figure 12. Atlas HAS Simulation Results with B = 500,000