CIA-미확인 이상 현상(UAP)-019, 호주 국방부 과학 및 UFO 문제의 인텔 측면

Dated to 1971, an Australian review of the USAF Project Blue Book. This document was released by the National Archives of Australia. 

Approved for Release 2026 Under Section 1842 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024





4,dth the recommerdiitiunis nf the Condon report, Project BLUE BOOK
vas terI11inated, but presumably this veu]d ha.vo little effect on
the main progr1-;1,n,me.
5. It would a.ppenr wrong for Au:stralia to remain ignorant ci'
the true situa'ticr::.. We l&ck an intelligence viewpoint th11.t ca.n
&seess the nature and poasiblo consequences of the problem, ~
scientific vie~~oint that co~ld derive :!ICicntifically valid data
from the reports &nd a public relations viewpoint that ca~ honestly
satisfy public intere:!lt. To overcome these deficiencies in the
Australian iuvestigaliun of UF0 1 s, it would :5eem that a strong ce.s,:i
exists for the acceptance. of the RAAF suggest.ion that another
government department assume responsibility for the investigation
and analysis o.r UFO report.!.
National Archives of Au,straHa NAA: A 13693, 3092/2/00Q

U.S. OPFICIAL ATTITUDE TO U.P.D•:s
In June of 19,17 the Air Techni~ o.l Int('lligcncc Centre
(ATIC) near Dayton, Ohio, assumed a. re·,pcnsibility to investiga.te
the ioitio.l 1 ::.:ports of 'flying saucers'. Vi tldn a month ii, 1ou
cons:iderc~I tho:!. tlui plHWDllH!llct. Wt!.tl~ I"F!tLl o.nd !H·obably of Soviet
origin. Ey the end of' the y .. a.r when ATIC was offie ially author iso-i
1
to invntiga.to under the project code no.n.c of SIGN and with a. high
priority,most nf the investigators lrl'er:: focus:dng on an inter­
planetary ra~her tha11 a. Soviet origin. TJJese opi n:i ans were
cry:stalliz:;-d into 11 "'ritten csti:nate that .,,·as sent to the Pentagon
in September 1948. Vnen the inte rplo.nc to.ry cone lusions were re ,:j ~c .od
on th<J groumls of instifficiant ha.rd evidence, a reaction :set in a.t
ATIC e.gl!l.insti trying to unravel the liFO problem.
2. In Febru~ry 1949, ATIC personnol ur. Project SIG~ were
replaced Witt> nev personnel 1-0 form Project tHtUJJGE. A defini·te
attempt vas mado during !.9·19 to use Project GRUDGE to destroy any
acccptani::o of UPO'!!!. The motives for this ;ue not t:lear: po:s:o.ih!y
Air Pore,~ embarnLssmE!.n t at being incap.,.ble of controlling tha
situation <tnd/:•r a fear of national p{l.nic prompted L"SAF to try and
remove the problem by denying its existence. Another possible
motive mo.y have been to provide a breathing spncc ror nno Urnr
"inve:stigati ve agency '1 to 1·each some cone lusion; the agency had been
asehting A.TIC through 1948 and, con1.rary to official USAF policy,
vas maintaining a bich level of interest during 1949. This govcrn~ental
agency '-'IHI not th,~ FBI, e.nd had rcckl!'t, nuclca.· and inti!llig,~ncP.
experts; their pur1,o,;;e was to study OFO n:port,s in an effort to HlltllE!l'
de:,ign data Oil int-erplanetury spacesh ip!'I. In lhe light of l.a ter
development~, thiR agency wus almost certainly the CIA.
3. Project GRUDGE failed to eliminate the UFO problem, U1"0
reports in 1949 actmdly exceeded the numbr!r in 1918, and several
people who had gained ,1.ccess to earlier offici,d repor!.s wPre ublli
to contnuJic l Lhe USAF. Journalists gonero.lly !elt that GRCDGE
:reporting represented e. cover to a more serious kno•.!cdgc. Eventually,
USAF intelligence dE>c ided. thi'.t a fresh approo.ch to the JJr1,bl em "'HS
ne-ccs~ary. Between Se1,t.r1m·:Jr:r 1951 unu I.he establ:i.shnent of Pro,i(•Ct
BLUE BOOK in March 1952, UFO investigation rugn.incd ndcquo.tc finrinC'inl
and o.dministra:tive :JUpport to once a.gain aaa.ly:se the col lee teu uc.ta,
Projttct BLUE IlOOK was a.ble tu process !Jiu data frci::n 3,200 report,E int.o
a form suitable for their consul tan Ls to bl' :!.blc to use IBM card-
National Archives of Australia NAA: A 13693, 3092/2/000

2 •
• sorting machines.
~- The su111me r {if 1952 sa"' & more thaa twenty-fold rise in
the normal r1,1.te of reporhng and inclu~ed I-he two cxtensive Jul!·
eigbtings invdviog lia.shington D.C. This marked increase in !'!ightin~:s
bad diverae efl'ect:,. A cu•npunent. of USAF intcl..1..igence considertJd
th1.t UPO 's W&l'e intcrpl1\11eia!"y spo.cClships \lhich vore about to make
closer ec,utnct, To prepare the public for this po:isibility 41
1
previously cl~ssified reports vere re}Pasei for publication bet~eeo.
AugtJ.st 19~ 2 rnd February 1953. These reports contradicted the
earlie?' offic io.1 USAF policy of di511li5siog the reporb as mi5-
identification:, etc. On the other hand, the CIA regarded tho su~mPr
UFO activity as a throat to national security mainly because the
resulting crowdeo communications and defence forcee involvement
lessened. the lfvel of national a.lertmi:ss r:,gains t possible en!'my P.ttaclt.
5. .\ 3C ienti!'ic p:.ncl chaired 'Dy H.P. Robert:son was '::onvened b1•
the Office of Scientific 1nte11 igence c!' CU. during mid-January 1953
tor the purpose of recot1m11nding future o.ction on the UFO proble11.
Briefings vcr<; n,a.dc both by CIA a.nd USAF. ATJr:: per:,onnel sho•ti11 t:1e
then c l:i.asified two rnovi e films of UPO 's and the early results of
statistical analysis of J,200 reports. Because of the vital issues
involVl'Jd, th~ pane I f'e J t re:: t ric ted to recon::mend i ne that the
investigetion be contimrnd, but 'Wi Lh increased personnel and equipn:ent.
'l'he USAF responded proa1ptly '>li th a.n instrue tion to comply vitb these
recommondntiona.
6. Th~ CIJ. ho-ever, in a report dated 16 February 1953 aho'o,c,d
1
a preference to publicly abandon the investigo.tion whil:!it intensifying
the collection Clf data. Hy September 1953 Lhe CIA position had been
la.rgdy achieved with Project BLUE BOOK rcducad from A staff of ten
qualified po:rsonnel operating at a top secret level to a virtually
inactive project involving one airman. The invc5tigating ~omponPnl
had bel'n tre.nsferred to the 4602nd Air 111 lc.,.ligli'nce Se:rvic e Squadron
vhieh was trained in rapid intelligence procurement and reported to
Air Defence Command and USAF Intellizence '\ia!';hi.ngt.on rel.her than
Bl,IJE DOOK. Direct accus s be tween the 4602nd AISS and ::.11 USAF uni t.s
vas atnhorized by AFH 200-2 whcrens previously this privilege had
boon g-i ve-n to BLUE BOOK. Al thnugh on1y Llw v.irracrn (first-class)
remained in Sept.e111ber 1943, BLUE BOOK was later built up to one
officer, one sergeant, one secret-ary, and a pa:rL-t.ime·c:-00!:!ultc:1.nt
_____
__________________
: National Archives of A _u _:_stralia NAA: A 1369 __3 _;, , 3092/2/000 _.

3.
f
Dr J. All(m Hyrwk, staying at about this level until it was closed
dovn in December 1969. During Lhis t.inw BLUE BOO){ served mo.inly
as e. moo.ns of supplying unclo.ss ified su111maries of UFO identifice:Li<mB
to the public, a.nd did not form a vitn1 link in collection or
Berious analysis.
7. Control of public awareness of the UFO situati.:in vas
tightened by the issuing of JAKAP 146 in 1953 which prohibited
service personnel from di.,cussing UFO's by threatening defaulLerc;
with up to 10 years gaol and up to a $10,000 fine. When service
personnel resigned or re tired, howe..-er, 1 t wa.s po:iisible to reTeal
US.AF attitude~ o- opinions even if 11.ctual jR.ta was still rec1 t.dc Le(1 ,
Ia. this way many Intelligence .Dffi::crs associ-o.tcd·-_wi th the UFO problem,
including Major D. Fournet who was BI.CF. BOOK Project Officer at the
Pentagon until l~te 1952, Captatn E. Ruppolt who headed Project
GRUDGE and Prt,ject BLUE .BOOK until September 1')53 and Admiral
Hillenkoetter who directed CIA from it, inception until October 1950,
on retiring froffi tho services, all publicly s~ated that the U.S.
Gover:iment knc., UF0 1 s were extra-torrestial but vu.s ..,.ithholding
this fact fro!D the public.
8. When the National Investigation Committee on Aerial Phenom~na
(NICAP} was fornllHi in 1955 to counter the publicly suppre3sed USAF
invostigation of UFO's, the firet Cha.irman was Admiral D.S. Fahrney
who h~d directed the Navy's guided missile programme from its
inception. Apft,rt, from Admiral Hillenl~oettt>r, Major Keyboe and
Major Fo11rne-t, other Directors have incluilod Rear Admi!"al H.B. Kno1,les,
General A. Wedemeyer and t:ol J,J. Brye.a (who was special assistant
.:i.
to the Ser.retl'l.ry of the Air Foree). To reduce the effect of these
&nd similar defections from o!ficia.l policy after rd,irernP.ni., the
revised JANAP 146E, passed in 1960, made it an offence under the
Eepionage Act if data on UFO's were revealed,
9. The change in style of USAF reporting before and after the
Robertson penel meeting is clearly indicated in the Project BLUE BOOK
Special Report No. 14, The body of the rl'port. prep<'-rell hetve.en
March 11)52 and early l95J, i:dthough bicsod in favour of a natural
expll:.na-Licn for UE'O' s, ne"",:irl.'rui l ciss shm,ed mathematically that the
evidence favoured an explanation that was scientifically unknown,
This sect.ion of the 116 page report was not released to the public
other then aa ~ copy to ho consulted, assuming the readnr kn~w uf
National Archives of Australia NAA: A:1 3693, 3092/2/000

4.
4
its existe-nce. Public disl.rihut.ion vaa !ll~de, ho,.-ev{lr, of a so­
ee.lled 11 summa.ry" 1-hich in fa.ct did not Sul"lmariso, nor scarcely
&lludo to the 19·17-52 dc.ta but conccntra.tcd or. 1953-55 rcportin.;
1
which vas cle~rly designed to reduce the residual unknowns to nn
insi{:nificant number, no matter how senseless tho identification
became.
10. Vi t.hin U1u body of the diffi cul t.-to-oh ta.in .repo'r l thei-e
il!I an intores~ing diagram. The product of the estimated obr.erv"r
relia.bil i ty and t.be rel)ort reliability be,ame the sighting
relinllility. Tht! ,percenlng!! of reporls that had to be register"'J
a.s t•unkno1.1n 11 (i.e. incapsble of being .,ye,. approximately identifi ,.-d
aa a. known object) increased as the sighting reliability impi.·o·:ed.
Conver5eJy, the percentage listed as "insufficient info~naLion"
d"creased with improving reliability.
~ighting No. of Uoknovn Insufficie111,
Relia.bili ty Reports (%) Informs.ti en
(,t;)
Poor 435 16.6 21.4
Doubtful 794 13.0 14.0
Good 757 24.8 J.6
Excellent 213 33.3 '1.2
11. Throughout the years of the UFO phc,nomenon, there has been
e. persistent for:n of official pronouncements ',/hich state thut th-,
percentage of unknnwn5 would bA redu~ed if more data were c~ailnble.
The tshove table contradicts that statement. Reports of excellent
reliability g1merally s tom from a.strono:nerE:, pilots, scientists,
surveyorn mctcorolo;:ists, radar operators etc, complete with
1
instrumented valueR and Rccund,ely cllit.fdlt~d uc:counts. The
introduction o~ good raliablo reporting pr•vnnts the roady prosaic
int.eq>ri~tation, In all probability the overall average percentr.g!J
of llnkno..,ns ( 19. T~) would h:~.ve be ,m subs len I, ia l ly increased if thE.'
dita hnd been more reliablo.
12, Project BLUE BOOK ccmsul tants sta.ti s t:i cal ly tos ted the
unknovn object popula~ion to determine the likelihood tbat it wn3
similar to the popult\tion of identified objects and found tha.t the
probability was less than one in 1028 (i,e. using the American
~ational Archives of Australia NAA A 13693, 3092/2/000

4.
4
its existe-nce. Public disl.rihut.ion vaa !ll~de, ho,.-ev{lr, of a so­
ee.lled 11 summa.ry" 1-hich in fa.ct did not Sul"lmariso, nor scarcely
&lludo to the 19·17-52 dc.ta but conccntra.tcd or. 1953-55 rcportin.;
1
which vas cle~rly designed to reduce the residual unknowns to nn
insi{:nificant number, no matter how senseless tho identification
became.
10. Vi t.hin U1u body of the diffi cul t.-to-oh ta.in .repo'r l thei-e
il!I an intores~ing diagram. The product of the estimated obr.erv"r
relia.bil i ty and t.be rel)ort reliability be,ame the sighting
relinllility. Tht! ,percenlng!! of reporls that had to be register"'J
a.s t•unkno1.1n 11 (i.e. incapsble of being .,ye,. approximately identifi ,.-d
aa a. known object) increased as the sighting reliability impi.·o·:ed.
Conver5eJy, the percentage listed as "insufficient info~naLion"
d"creased with improving reliability.
~ighting No. of Uoknovn Insufficie111,
Relia.bili ty Reports (%) Informs.ti en
(,t;)
Poor 435 16.6 21.4
Doubtful 794 13.0 14.0
Good 757 24.8 J.6
Excellent 213 33.3 '1.2
11. Throughout the years of the UFO phc,nomenon, there has been
e. persistent for:n of official pronouncements ',/hich state thut th-,
percentage of unknnwn5 would bA redu~ed if more data were c~ailnble.
The tshove table contradicts that statement. Reports of excellent
reliability g1merally s tom from a.strono:nerE:, pilots, scientists,
surveyorn mctcorolo;:ists, radar operators etc, complete with
1
instrumented valueR and Rccund,ely cllit.fdlt~d uc:counts. The
introduction o~ good raliablo reporting pr•vnnts the roady prosaic
int.eq>ri~tation, In all probability the overall average percentr.g!J
of llnkno..,ns ( 19. T~) would h:~.ve be ,m subs len I, ia l ly increased if thE.'
dita hnd been more reliablo.
12, Project BLUE BOOK ccmsul tants sta.ti s t:i cal ly tos ted the
unknovn object popula~ion to determine the likelihood tbat it wn3
similar to the popult\tion of identified objects and found tha.t the
probability was less than one in 1028 (i,e. using the American
~ational Archives of Australia NAA A 13693, 3092/2/000

5.
4f
system, the odds were ten thousand trillion trillion to one
ago.in:5t the unk,rni.n:5 being the same as the known:s). Since the
consultants !'tad arbitrarily called al 1 gni~n firoball!5 a.ml short
dura. tion (i.e. less than f i vc seconds) n.1.ght-timc si.ghtings ns
known nstronornicltl 0l1j11r. t.R !,here was tin undue preponderance in
tba.t cntogo1'y. Hence, as1rnming that 11'> ·'1'3trononlical objocts were
left in the unknni.ns, the :stati:stical tests ..-ere repented vith
astronomical i,lentifice.tions removed. Tne odds were reduced to
i.-~
tri l lior. ~rillien to one-. The ena.lysts could not find a way
to reduce th.:?se odds sufficiently further to warrant additional
tel!!ting, and i rra.tionally considered. the results to ba "inconc lu~ ive11 •
lJ. While PROJECT BLUE DOOK cndao.Tourcd to reduce the official
number of uukr_o.:ns - in 1957 they claimed. ouly 14 out of l tQQ(i
sightings remained unidentified - the covert programme expanded
considcra.bly. 'l'he govcrnn:ent agency ( al-no:it certainly CIA) tha.~
had been collecting da.ta on l:F(' per!orma:ice a.nd propulsion methods
durini; 1948-52 presu:nably inf' luenced U.S. goYernmen tal funding of
certain 'lava.need projec·l:i. One project was the Canadian Avro sau;:-er.
A dra.win1 oft.his saucer 1eleo.scd ill Gctober 1955. showed a typical
flying disc a!" dt~<;t~ r i !:rnd in many UFO reports. The Secretary of t¾I!
Air Force, D,J,., Q~.,arles, appeared moderately confident that such
a vehicle '1ould be s1:cce!'l:!irul1y develop!:!tl oy the U.S.
14. A more utounding deci:don en the part of the U.S. Government
was ·1,o allocate considerable:- funds to investigate gravity and a.
■ eans nf controiling g:ravity. Despite the fact that science b.::.d
not attained a Jqvel of competence to d~al with either gravity or
anti-gravity probler.1s aJld the only tt1oory tha.t