UNCLASSIFIED-FY23: 미확인 이상 현상(UAP)에 대한 통합 연례 보고서-2023년 10월 25일 1236

2023 Report: All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office Annual Report on Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena

UNCLASSIFIED
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Fiscal Year 2023 Consolidated Annual Report on
Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena
October 2023
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
Table of Contents
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ......................................................................................................... 2
II. SCOPE AND ASSUMPTIONS ................................................................................................. 4
III. UAP REPORTING IS INCREASING ACROSS THE USG, AND THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF IMPROVED ANALYTIC PROCESSES IS REVEALING TRENDS 5
A. Overall Trend Analysis .......................................................................................................... 5
B. Geographic and Safety Trends Coming into Focus ................................................................ 5
C. Increased FAA Reporting Shifting Geographic Collection Bias and Morphology Trend ..... 8
D. No Health/Physiological Impacts from UAP Incidents Reported .......................................... 8
E. Data and Intelligence Sources Received Through Various Intelligence Channels ................ 8
IV. AARO PROGRAM UPDATES ............................................................................................... 8
A. Analytic Division ................................................................................................................... 8
B. Operations and Collections Division ...................................................................................... 9
C. Science and Technology (S&T) Division ............................................................................... 9
D. Strategic Communications Division ....................................................................................... 9
V. WAY FORWARD ................................................................................................................... 10
VI. APPENDICES ........................................................................................................................ 11
Appendix A: Case Closure Report ............................................................................................ 11
Appendix B: Glossary of Terms................................................................................................ 14
1
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report is provided by the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) in response to a requirement established in the National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2022, Section 1683 (h), as amended by
Section 6802(k) of the FY 2023 NDAA (as codified at 50 U.S.C. § 3373).
The report covers unidentified anomalous phenomena (UAP) reports from 31 August
2022 to 30 April 2023, and all UAP reports from any previous time periods that were not
included in an earlier report. The All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office (AARO) received a
total of 291 UAP reports during this period, consisting of 274 that occurred during this period
and another 17 that occurred during previous reporting periods from 2019–2022, but had not
been conveyed in previous submissions.
Reporting from this period continues to depict a strong but shifting collection bias. Most
reports still reflect a bias towards restricted military airspace, a result of reporting from military
personnel and sensors present in such areas. This bias has been lessened by reporting from
commercial pilots showing a more diverse geographic distribution of UAP sightings across the
United States. However, these reports mostly cover observations over U.S. airspace and littoral
waters, and therefore, as these reports continue to come in, a U.S.-centric collection bias will
grow significantly relative to the rest of the world.
During the reporting period, AARO received no reports indicating UAP sightings have
been associated with any adverse health effects. However, many reports from military witnesses
do present potential safety of flight concerns, and there are some cases where reported UAP have
potentially exhibited one or more concerning performance characteristics such as high-speed
travel or unusual maneuverability. AARO has de-conflicted these cases with potential U.S.
programs and continues to work closely with its DoD and Intelligence Community (IC) mission
partners to identify and attribute any objects found in these cases. Additionally, AARO
continues to investigate and research all cases in its holdings.
While the mere presence of UAP in the airspace represents a potential hazard to flight
safety, none of these reports suggest the UAP maneuvered to an unsafe proximity to civil or
military aircraft, positioned themselves in flight paths, or otherwise posed a direct threat to the
flight safety of the observing aircraft. Although none of these UAP reports have been positively
attributed to foreign activities, these cases continue to be investigated.
AARO continues to make progress receiving, standardizing, analyzing, and resolving
reports of UAP; working with military and technical partners to improve sensor placement and
calibration to better collect against UAP; to elevate the quality of reporting; and to provide risk
reduction for improved domain awareness.
While this progress is facilitating collection and analysis of the UAP problem set, the
continued volume and unidentified nature of most UAP is a direct consequence of gaps in
domain awareness. These gaps are the direct result of insufficient data secured by radar, electro-
optical (EO)/infrared (IR) sensors; the presence of sensor artifacts, such as IR flare; and optical
2
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
effects, such as parallax, that can cause observational misperceptions. Based on the ability to
resolve cases to date, with an increase in the quality of data secured, the unidentified and
purported anomalous nature of most UAP will likely resolve to ordinary phenomena and
significantly reduce the amount of UAP case submissions.
3
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
II. SCOPE AND ASSUMPTIONS
Scope
This consolidated annual report is provided by DoD and ODNI in response to a
requirement established in the NDAA for FY 2022, Section 1683(h), as amended by Section
6802(k) of the FY 2023 NDAA (as codified at 50 U.S.C. § 3373), which states: “Not later than
180 days after the date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2023, and annually thereafter for four years, the Director of National Intelligence and the
Secretary of Defense shall jointly submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on
unidentified anomalous phenomena.”
This report was drafted by AARO and ODNI’s National Intelligence Manager for
Military Integration (NIM-MIL) and coordinated with the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence and Security; the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense and Hemispheric Affairs; the Office of the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs; the Office of the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters; the Office of the General Counsel of the
DoD; the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs; ODNI’s NIM-
Economic Security and Emerging Technology; ODNI’s National Counterintelligence and
Security Center; ODNI’s National Intelligence Council; the Department of Energy; the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission; the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA); the
National Security Agency; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency; the DoD Joint Staff; the National Ground Intelligence Center; the Missile
and Space Intelligence Center; the Office of Naval Intelligence/National Maritime Intelligence
Center; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA); the
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO); the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric
Administration; the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL); the National Air and Space
Intelligence Center (NASIC); the Oak Ridge National Laboratory; the Naval Criminal
Investigative Service; the U.S. Army; the U.S. Navy (USN); the U.S. Marine Corps; the U.S. Air
Force (USAF); and the U.S. Space Force (USSF).
Assumptions
The assumptions inherent in this mission set remain the same as outlined in the previous
report, which is that a wide range of factors can influence the observation and detection of UAP,
observers convey their accurate recollection of their perception of the event, and that sensors
generally operate correctly. However, AARO and NIM-MIL recognize that many reports are
probably the result of sensor artifacts, equipment error, misidentification, or misperception.
4
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
III. UAP REPORTING IS INCREASING ACROSS THE U.S. GOVERNMENT (USG),
AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF IMPROVED ANALYTIC PROCESSES IS
REVEALING TRENDS
A. Overall Trend Analysis
The report covers UAP reports from August 31, 2022, to 30 April 2023, and all UAP
reports from any previous time periods that were not included in an earlier report. AARO
received a total of 291 UAP reports during this period, consisting of 274 that occurred during
this period and another 17 that occurred during previous reporting periods from 2019-2022 but
had not been conveyed in previous submissions. Of these reports, 290 occurred within the air
domain and one in the maritime domain. No transmedium or space domain UAP reports were
submitted to AARO. The increase in reporting is, in part, due to deepening federal relationships
and AARO’s ability to incorporate new reports into its adjudication and research process. UAP
mission partners continue to coordinate, collaborate, and streamline processes. With these new
reports, as of April 30, 2023, AARO has received a total of 801 UAP reports.
B. Geographic and Safety Trends Coming into Focus
Reporting from this period continues to depict a strong but shifting collection bias. Most
reports still reflect a bias towards restricted military airspace, a result of reporting from military
personnel and sensors present in such areas. This bias has been lessened by reporting from
commercial pilots showing a more diverse geographic distribution of UAP sightings across the
United States. However, these reports mostly cover observations over U.S. airspace and littoral
waters, and therefore, as these reports continue to come in, a U.S.-centric collection bias will
grow significantly relative to the rest of the world.
5
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 1: Reported UAP Morphologies FY 2023
Ambiguous Sensor
Contact, 5%
Orb, Round, Sphere,
25%
Rectangle, 2%
Triangle, 1%
Irregular shapes, 6%
Not reported, 53%
Disk, 2%
Cylinder, 1%
Oval, 4%
UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 2: Reported Lights FY 2023
Lights , 21%
No Lights, 79%
UNCLASSIFIED
6
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 3: Reported UAP Altitudes FY 2023
UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 4: World Map Illustrating Geographic Distribution of UAP Reports FY 2023
UNCLASSIFIED
7
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
C. Increased FAA Reporting Shifting Geographic Collection Bias and Morphology Trend
AARO has received over 100 UAP incident reports from FAA that contribute to the trend
analysis of activity over the United States and its adjacent waters. Of the incident reports FAA
has shared with AARO, the vast majority concern sightings of unidentified lights without
specific shape at widely varying estimated altitudes (from less than 5,000 feet up to 60,000 feet).
None of these reports suggest the UAP were exhibiting anomalous characteristics, maneuvered
to an unsafe proximity to civil aircraft, or posed a threat to flight safety to the observing aircraft.
AARO will continue to add these reports, as appropriate, to the active archive where they will be
used in the overall trend analysis.
D. No Health/Physiological Impacts from UAP Incidents Reported
To date, no encounters with UAP have been confirmed to have directly contributed to
adverse health-related effects to the observer(s). ODNI and DoD acknowledge that health-
related effects may appear at any time after an event occurs, therefore any reported health
implications related to UAP will be tracked and examined if and when they emerge.
E. Data and Intelligence Sources Received Through Various Intelligence Channels
AARO’s new integrated analysis process ensures that raw intelligence related to UAP
from various intelligence disciplines are assimilated into all-source data packages analyzed by
teams of scientists and intelligence analysts. AARO’s analysts scour multiple classified and
unclassified databases to identify any existing data on each UAP case, prioritizing technical
sensor information that yields the highest quantity of pertinent, valuable data for review. As the
office employs more sensors specifically tailored for UAP detection, the amount and variety of
technical data produced will increase, facilitating more and better analytic fidelity.
IV. AARO PROGRAM UPDATES
A. Analytic Division
AARO’s analytic efforts are confirming that only a very small percentage of UAP reports
display interesting signatures, such as high-speed travel and unknown morphologies. The
majority of unidentified objects reported to AARO demonstrate ordinary characteristics of
readily explainable sources, while a large number of cases in AARO's holdings remain
technically unresolved because of a lack of data. Without sufficient data these cases cannot be
resolved. For the few objects that do demonstrate characteristics of interest, AARO is
approaching these cases with objectivity and analytic rigor. This approach includes physical
testing and employing modeling and simulation to validate analyses and the underlying theories,
and then peer reviewing those results before reaching any conclusions.
8
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
B. Operations and Collections Division
During the period of reporting, AARO, in close collaboration with the Joint Staff and
other DoD components, further normalized UAP operations, led development of reporting
standards; informed acquisition of mission-specific sensors; and guided integration of UAP
detection, identification, and mitigation efforts. Improving the quality of data from DoD sources
is important, since up to this point, most UAP cases have been derived from DoD mission reports
and are representative of observations in the Department’s operating, training, and testing areas.
C. Science and Technology Division
In accordance with the FY 2022 NDAA, Section 1683(g), as amended by the FY 2023
NDAA, Section 6802, AARO has established a multilayered science and technology (S&T) plan
that incorporates close partnerships with DoD Services, USG agencies, and other centers of
excellence to identify systems that may assist in AARO’s mission to detect, track, and
characterize UAP. This plan includes a sensor calibration campaign to measure known objects
that are often reported as UAP. These objects include balloon